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We may create a catch-22 so that only people who 
are unlikely to need health insurance can afford 
it. ... Genetic risk testing is important because it ex-
poses the logic of a system that provides access to 
health insurance to those least likely to need it. 1 
T he fear of generic discriminarion2 in the health in- · surance contexrl cannot be underestimated. Some have argued that individuals who might otherwise 
choose genetic testing will decline it based on their fear 
that they or their family members will not be able to ob-
tain or maintain health insurance coverage.~ As a result, 
the future of research on the benefits and risks of testing 
for genetic conditions, including susceptibility to such com-
mon diseases as cancer and heart disease, may also be in-
hibited. Thus, as the mapping of the human genome 
progresses and new genetic tests proliferate, policy makers 
need to evaluate the legislative and regulatory strategies ro 
address these concerns. 
Toward this goal, this article summarizes and analyzes 
state legislation on generic information and health insur-
ance. It also highlights the major policy considerations that 
must be addressed in order to reach consensus on future 
strategies. This article must be read in context with broader 
state health insurance reformsS and privacy legislation, as 
well as important federal legislative and regulatory approaches 
that affect health insurance and discrimination issues. 
The context of insurance6 
Group insurance, individual insurance, self-insurance, and 
publicly financed insurance (that is, Medicare or Medic-
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aid) represent the primary mechanisms for obtaining health 
insurance in the United States. Most insureds receive their 
health insurance through their employer, although over 
forty million Americans, many of whom are- employed, 
remain uninsured. 7 
Group insurance may be offered to employers based 
on the company's past claims (experience rating) or, as 
with Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans, on the average cost of a 
defined region (community rating). Coverage is also ob-
tained through health maintenance organizations (HMOs) 
and managed care plans, which may be subject to federal 
HM 0 regulations on rates, preexisting conditions, under-
writing, and other provisions of care. 
For small groups and individuals who apply for cover-
age, commercial insurers underwrite based on personal and 
family medical history, as well as on risk facrors such as 
age, occupation, and use of alcohol-and tobacco. Although 
state insurance laws prevent "unfai-r -discrimination," this 
provision has nor been interpreted to extend to underwrit-
ing based on family and medical history. Furthermore, in-
surance companies have argued that preventing their ac-
cess to all medical information will result in adverse selec-
tion, by which individuals who know they have a condi-
tion, disease, or predisposition to disease may purchase 
insurance coverage at a premium that will not cover losses. 
With increasing frequency, employers provide health 
insurance benefits through self-funded plans, in which the 
employer forms its own insurance pool, usually hiring an 
insurance company to administer its plan. It is estimated 
that over one-third of the nonelderly insured population 
throughout this country obtains its coverage through self-
funded plans.1 Self-funded plans providing private health 
benefits for employees and their dependents ate exempt 
from state insurance laws pursuant to the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act (ERISA) preemption.' Thus, 
The journal of Law. Medicine & Ethics 
these plans need not follow state laws that require health 
insurance contractS to include certain benefits, limit pre-
existing conditions, follow antidiscrimination restrictions, 
or other state health care reforms. 
The increasing use of self-funded plans complicates 
public policy on genetic information and insurance. Even 
though the McCarran-Ferguson Act10 provides that the 
states have the major regulatory authority for the business 
of insurance (and so limits any nationwide attempt at in-
surance reform), ERISA preemption prevents any compre-
hensive statewide approach to regulating the use of genetic 
information by all plans providing health benefits. Cur-
rendy, no federal legislation addresses genetic information 
in this context. Furthermore, although the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 199011 (ADA) protects persons with physi-
cal or mental disabilities-including genetic diseases, con-
ditions, and predispositions-from discrimination, 12 Tide 
V of the ADA provides that, absent "subterfuge," conven-
tional underwriting of risk by commercial insurers or self-
insured employers does not constitute prohibited discrimi-
nation. Thus, any comprehensive strategy to regulate ge-
netic discrimination in health insurance must be evaluated 
in the context of numerous state and federal regulatory 
issues. 
Evolution of state legislation 
In the 1970s, a few states began to pass legislation that 
addressed genetics issues. North Carolina, for example, 
passed legislation prohibiting health insurers from refus-
ing to issue insurance or from charging higher prerruums 
based on sickle cell trait or hemoglobin C trait.ll Florida 
passed similar legislation limited to sickle cell trait. 14 Leg-
islation passed by other states addressed primarily employ-
ment, forensics, paternity, and other forms of msurance. 
Many of these statutes also limited their focus to specific 
traits and disorders. By 1986, Maryland did pass legisla-
tion prohibiting health insurers from rate dJscnminatlon 
based on "sickle-cell trait, thalassemia-minor tra.Jt, hemo-
globin C trait, Tay-Sachs trait, or any genetic tra.Jt wh1ch 1s 
harmless within itself. "15 The legislation provided, how-
ever, that insurers could continue to use generic inforrTU· 
cion to discriminate if there was "acruarial justification. " 1• 
Establishing a new framework 
By 1991, a new generation of state legislation began to 
evolve with the passage of a Wisconsin law prohibmng 
health insurers from: 
• requiring or requesting an individual or a member of 
the individual's family to obtain a genetic test; 
• requiring or requesting directly or indirectly into the 
results of a genetic test; 
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• conditioning the provision of insurance coverage or 
benefits on genetic testing; or 
• considering generic testing in determining rates. 
This approach attempts to integrate protection against 
discrimination in insurance practices, coverage, benefits, 
and rates with some privacy protection for the individual 
and his/her family. Similar approaches have been incorpo-
rated to varying degrees in recent legislation passed in Cali-
fornia, 17 Colorado, 18 Georgia, 19 Minnesota, 20 New Hamp-
shire/1 Ohio,U and Oregon,23 as well as in bills currently 
pending in Hawaii, 24 Kansas, 25 Massachusetts, u and Penn-
sylvania. 27 It is worth noting that Ohio law does provide 
that an insurer may consider the results of genetic testing if 
voluntarily submitted and the results are favorable to the 
individual. (See Figures 1 and 2.) 
Genetic test defined 
These recently enacted statutes, summarized in Figure 1, 
focus narrowly on the genetic test, rather than on prohibit-
ing discrimination based more broadly on genetic infor-
mation generated from family history, physical examina-
tion, or the medical record. Oregon lawmakers did attempt 
to address this broader definition, but compromised in pro-
hibiting discrimination based on genetic information that 
is limited by definition to a genetic test (defined in part as 
a test of a genetic characteristic) or an individual's DNA 
sample. 28 California does not define genetic test, rather it 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of "genetic character-
istics," which is defined as "any scientifically or medically 
identifiable gene or chromosome, or alteration thereof, 
which is known to be a cause of a disease or disorder, or 
determined to be associated with a statistically increased 
risk of development of a disease or disorder, and which is 
asymptomatic of any disease or disorder. "29 
Regardless of the definition of genetic test, this new 
generanon of legislation is not focused on a specific ge-
netic tra.Jt or condition, but on a potentially unlimited num-
ber of tests. Wisconsin defines a genetic test as a rest using 
DNA ~extracted from an individual's cells in order to de-
termme the presence of a genetic disease or disorder or the 
mdividual's predisposition for a particular genetic disease 
or dtsorder. "10 In the few years since passage of that law, 
the deftnition of genetic test has evolved, based in part on 
advancmg technologies and medical knowledge, and in part 
on political compromise. Minnesota, for example, defines 
genetic test as a "presymptomatic test of a person's genes, 
gene products, or chromosomes for the purpose of deter-
mmmg the presence or absence of a gene or genes that 
exhibit abnormalities, defects, or deficiencies, including ear-
ner starus, that are known to be the cause of a disease or 
disorder, or are determined to be associated with a statisti-
cally increased risk of development of a disease or disor-
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State Citation Description 
Alabama (1982) Ala. Scat. 27-5-13 Prohibits health insurers from denying coverage because applicant has siclde 
cell anemia._ 
California {1995) Insur. Code SS 10123.3, Prohibits health insurance plans from offering or providing different tetms, 





' ( Health & Safety Code ss 1374.7, 1374.9 
California (1994) Insur. Code SS Prohibits health insurance plans from refusing to enroll or accept persons 
10123.3, 10140, based on genetic characteristics. 
10148, 10149, 
10149.1, 11512.95 
Health & Safety Code Prohibits health insurers from imposing a higher rate or charge on the 
s 1374.7 basis of genetic characteristics. 
Provides for privacy proteCtion of genetic information. 
Colorado (1994) 1it. 10, art. 3, pt. II, Prohibits use of information derived from genetic testing to deny access to 
s 10-3-1104.7 health care insurance. 
Provides for privacy protection of generic information. 
Florida (1978) Fla. Stat. 626.9707 Prohibits insurers from refusing to issue and deliver any policy of "disabil-
icy" insurance, which "affords benefits and coverage for any medical treat-
ment or service," solely because a person has the sickle cell trait. . 
Prohibits a "disability" insurance policy from charging a higher rate solely 
because a person has the sickle cell trait. 
Florida (1992) Fla. Stat. 760.40 Provides for informed consent and privacy protection of genetic informa-
cion. 
Provides for mandatory reanalysis if use of genetic information results in a 
..... '\ _, denial of insurance. 
---
Georgia (1995) 1it. 33, ch. 54 Prohibits use of generic testing except to obtain information for therapeutic 
or diagnostic purposes. 
Provides for written consent prior to generic testing. 
Provides for privacy protection of genetic informatiQn. 
Prohibits health insurers from seeking information derived from genetic testing. 
Maryland (1986) lnsur. Code art. 48A, Prohibits health insurers from making or permitting differentials in rates 
s 223(b)(4) based on any generic trait, unless acruarially justified. 
Minnesota (1995) 1995 Minn. Laws 251 Prohibits health insurers from using information from generic testing to de-
termine eligibility, establish premiums, limit coverage, or renew coverage. 
Prohibits health insurers from requiring a genetic test and from inquiring or 
determining whether an individual has had a generic test. 
New Hampshire 1995 N.H. Laws 101 Prohibits health insurers from conditioning provision of health insurance 
(1995) coverage on the results of generic testing. 
Prohibits health insurers from considering generic testing to determine rates 
or benefits. 
Prohibits health insurers from requiring a generic test and from inquiring or 
determining whether an individual has had a generic test. 
North Carolina N.C. Stat. S 58-65-70 Prohibits health insurers from denying health insurance because an indivi-
(1975) dual has sickle cell trait or hemoglobin C trait. 
Prohibits health insurers from charging higher premiums based on siclde cell 
trait or hemoglobin C trait. 
Figure 1. Genetic Information and Health Insurance: Enacted Legislation. 
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State Citation Description 
Ohio (1993) Oh. Stat. SS 1742.42, Prohibits health insurers from cmcding, refusing to issue, renewing cover· 
age, or limiting benefits based on genetic screening or testing. 1742.43, 3901.49, 
3901.491, 3901.50, Prohibits health insurers from requiring a genetic test or inquiring about 
results of genetic screening or testing. 3901.501 
Provides for consideration of genetic testing if results are favorable to the 
applicmt and volunrarily submitted. 
H. 71 S 3, Oh. 120th Gen. Establishes the Task Force on Genetic Testing in Health Insurance. 
Assembly (1993) (enacted) 
Oregon (1995) 1995 Or. Laws 680 Prohibits health insurers from using genetic information to reject, deny, limit, 
cancel, refuse to renew, increase the rares of, or affect the terms and condi· 
tions of health insurance policies. 
Provides for informed consent and privacy protection of genetic informa· 
tion. 
Virginia (1995) S.]. Res. 372 Establishes a subcommittee to study the legal and policy ramifications of 
breast cmcer susceptibility gene research, including the ethical and legal 
issues of health insurance coverage and reimbursement. 
Wisconsin (1991) Wis. Stat. S 631.89 Prohibits health insurers from conditioning provision of insurance coverage 
or benefits on genetic teSting. 
Prohibits use of genetic testing information in determining rates. 
Prohibits health insurers from requiring a genetic test or inquiring whether a 
genetic rest has been performed. 
Figure 1. Continued. 
der. "31 A few states, including California32 and New Hamp· 
shire,33 include reliance on "scientific or medical" accep· 
ranee of the generic rest within its definition. 
Most recently, a Wisconsin bill which has been intro· 
duced significantly expands the definition of generic test 
to include "a physical examination of an individual or an 
examination of the family history of an individual to deter-
mine ... whether an individual has a genetic disease or disorder 
... or is predisposed ro a generic disease or disorder. "J.< To 
prohibit discrimination based on prenatal generic testing, 
"individual" is defined to include an unborn child.JS 
Insurance entity defined 
It is difficult to define in any general terms the "insurance" 
entities covered by these statutes, partly because each state 
defines its jurisdiction pursuant to its own insurance code 
and regulatory authority. Generally, the Statutes cover health 
insurance plans, which may be further delineated as hospi-
tal service plans, HMOs, third-party administrators, and 
government entities providing coverage for health care ser-
vices on a self-insured basis. New Hampshire boldly ex-
tends its definition to include self-insurance plans gener-
ally,3' even though ERISA is deemed to preempt state in· 
surance regulation for those plans provided by private 
employers. This statute also provides, as do most of the 
other statutes, that life and disability income insurance are 
not included among the insurance entities prohibited from 
using generic test results.37 
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Privacy protections integrated 
Concerns over privacy and genetic information are ad· 
dressed to varying degrees in many of the statutes. As noted 
earlier, the Wisconsin law established that insurers may 
not "require or request directly or indirectly any individual 
to reveal whether the individual or a member of the 
individual's family has obtained a generic test or what the 
results of the test, if obtained by the individual or a mem· 
ber of the individual's family, were."38 Many of the other 
state laws and pending bills (in Figures 1 and 2) have also 
adopted this provision. Ironically, the !ecent Wisconsin bill39 
that expands the definition of generic-test, deletes this pro-
vision. Proponents of the bill believe that as long as state 
law prohibits the use of genetic information in the under· 
writing process, health insurers may have legitimate rea· 
sons to require or request genetic information. For example, 
they argue that HMOs, which are both insurers and pro-
viders, may need this information to treat the patient and 
insurers may need access to this information to verify 
claims.40 
Other states have further expanded on privacy issues. 
California, for example, prohibits disclosure of genetic test 
results to any third party without written authorization. 41 
Written authorization is required for each separate disclo-
sure of generic rest results and must specify the person or 
entiry to whom the disclosure will be made. Negligent and 
willful disclosure without authorization are subject to both 
civil and criminal liability. Colorado specifically provides 
that information obtained from genetic testing shall be "con· 
'i 
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State Citation Description 
Hawaii s. 299; s. 576; Prohibits health insurers from requiring genetic testing or inquiring whether 
H. 1556 generic resting has been performed. 
Prohibits health insurers from conditioning provision of coverage or bene-
fits on generic testing. 
Prohibits health insurers from determining rates based on genetic testing. 
Kansas H. 2251 Prohibits health insurers from requiring or requesting directly or indirectly 
any individual ro obtain a generic test or ro reveal whether one has been 
performed. 
Prohibits health insurers from conditioning provision of coverage or bene-
fits on generic resting. 
Prohibits health insurers from determining rates based on generic testing. 
Massachusetts s. 2045 Establishes commission to consider appropriate role for state regarding the 
use of generic information, including whether state should take a direct 
role in regulating collection, access to, and use of generic information. 
H. 4485 Prohibits health insurers from refusing to enroll any person on the basis of 
generic testing. 
Prohibits health insurers from imposing a higher rate on the basis of gene-
ric characteristics. 
Provides for informed consent and privacy protection of generic informa-
tion. 
Prohibits underwriterS from seeking or obtaining generic information. 
Michigan H. 5237 Prohibits insurance companies from refusing to insure or limiting coverage 
due to refusal to submit to .generic testing or the results of generic resting. 
Nebraska L. 698 Establishes commission to srudy the use of human genetic information and 
its impact on insurance. 
Pennsylvania H. 1662 Prohibits health insurers from requiring or requesting direcrly or indirectly 
any individual to obtain a generic test or to reveal whether one has been 
obtained and, if so, its results. 
---
Prohibits health insurers from conditioning provision of coverage on gene-
ric testing. 
Prohibits health insurers from determining rates based on generic testing. 
Wisconsin A. 227 Broadens the current state definition of generic test to include physical ex-
aminarion or family hisrory. 
Removes current prohibitions against requiring or requesting an individual 
to obtain a generic test or to reveal whether one has been obtained and, if 
so, Its results. 
Maintains the prohibitions against conditioning insurance coverage or 
determining rares based on generic resting. 
Figure 2. Genetic Information and Health Insurance:: Pending Legislation as of December 31, 1995. 
fidenrial and privileged,"42 and Oregon and Georgia estab-
lish that generic information is the "property of the indi-
vidual. "43 Nevertheless, they both provide, as do a number 
of the other states, for specific exceptions in which written 
authorization is not required for disclosure (that is, pater-
nity, criminal proceedings, or health department protocols). 
Even when these statutes require informed consent prior 
to genetic testing, they do not address whether the informed 
consent process will incorporate a warning that the test 
results may be disclosed without authorization under cer-
tain circumstances. 
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A Florida law passed in 1992 also permits DNA analy-
sis to be used 'Nithour informed consent in criminal prosecu· 
tions, other criminal matters, and paternity determinations."" 
Except in these circumstances, the Statute declares that the 
test results are the exclusive property of the person tested, 
are confidential, and may not be disclosed without consent. 
Nevertheless, the statute does not prohibit the use of ge-
netic information in determining health insurance cover-
age and benefits. If DNA test results are used in any decision to 
grant or deny insurance, the individual must be notified, 
and the analysis must be repeated to verify its accuracy. 
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Some statUtes address privacy issues created by access 
to shared insurance data bases. The Wisconsin45 and New 
Hampshire44 laws provide that insurers writing life and 
disability income insurance in addition to health insur-
ance cannot use genetic test information to underwrite their 
health insurance policies. In Minnesota, where a life insur-
ance company may require a genetic test, the statute pro-
vides that written informed consent must include infor-
mation on the uses and limitations of the test, as well as 
the individual's right to confidential treaonent of the in-
formation. 47 It is worth noting that the Minnesota stat-
ute specifically provides that "[if] the individual tested has 
not given written consent authorizing the physician to 
receive the test results, the individual must be urged 
at the time that the individual is informed of the genetic 
test results ... to contact a generic counselor or other 
health care professional. "48 Similar provisions are in-
cluded in the California statute49 and the MassachusettS 
bill_5° 
Study groups established 
Over the last few years, a number of states, most recently 
Nebraska,S1 Ohio,n and Vtrginia,53 have passed legislation 
. , .. to. establish task forces or commissions to study the policy 
and societal issues raised by genetic information. The state 
of Virginia specifically provides for a subcommittee to 
study the l~al and policy ramifications of breast cancer 
susceptibility· gene research, including the ethical and 
legal issues of health insurance coverage and reimburse-
ment. 
Other legislative experiences 
Recently, a number of other states have attempted to pass 
without success legislation addressing generic discrimina-
tion and health. Proposals often failed because of splits 
along political party lines. In Texas/' the genetic discrimi-
nation and insurance bill failed in committee despite a com-
promise that would have removed disability income and 
life insurance. When the bill was put to a committee vote, 
two liberal members refused to support the bill because it 
was limited only to health insurance. In fact, in a number 
of the states that have enacted legislation, bills were passed 
only after life and/or disability income insurance were ex-
cluded. New York State has attempted legislation to ad-
dress health insurance issues as part of a comprehensive 
omnibus bill addressing numerous generic discrimination 
issues. ss This approach has not achieved support, and the 
legislature is now considering ocher bills limited to one 
issue at a rime (that is, employmenrl6 or privacf?). In other 
states, legislators have indicated that there is a lack of un-




The development of public policy to address generic infor-
mation and health insurance must be analyzed in light of a 
complex and inadequate health insurance system, the un-
certainty about the future scope and impact of generic test-
ing, and the political realities of a pluralistic society. The 
current patchwork of state legislative approaches does not 
provide a comprehensive solution to genetic discrimina-
tion and health insurance. State laws focus narrowly on 
genetic tests, rather than broadly on genetic information 
generated by family history, physical examination, or the 
medical record. Although health insurers are prohibited 
from using the results of a chemical test of DNA, or the 
protein product of a gene, they can still use other pheno-
type indicators, patterns of inheritance of genetic charac-
teristics, or requests for genetic testing as the basis for dis-
crimination. 58 Thus, "meaningful protection against generic 
discrimination requires that insurers be prohibited from 
using all information about genes, gene products, or inher-
ited characteristics to deny or limit health insurance cover-
age. "59 
Second, a large proportion of the population receives 
its health benefits from self-insured plans not subject to 
State insurance laws. The ERISA preemption prevents a 
statewide approach to regulating the use of genetic infor-
mation by all plans providing health benefits. Furthermore, 
no federal laws specifically address genetic discrimination 
in health insurance. 
Recent health insurance proposals at both the state 
and federal level focus primarily on modest reform in the 
areas of accessibility, portability, and renewability of cov-
erage, prohibiting insurers from denying coverage based 
on health Status or medical condition, but often permitting 
exclusions for preexisting conditions for limited time peri-
ods. It is unclear whether and to what extent genetic infor-
mation would be covered by these proposals. 60 For example, 
unlike medical conditions, generic information may pro-
vide insight into an individual's and/or family member's 
predisposition to future disease.61 
With these policy considerations in mind, the follow-
mg recommendations were developed by the Working 
Group on Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications of the 
Human Genome Project (ELSI)62 and the National Action 
Plan on Breast Cancer (NA.PBC)'J as guidelines for both 
state and federal policy makers to protect against genetic 
discrimination: 64 
(1) Insurance providers should be prohibited from 
using genetic information, or an individual's request 
for genetic services, to deny or limit any coverage or 
to eStablish eligibility, continuation, enrollment, or 
contribution requirements. 
(2) Insurance providers should be prohibited from 
establishing differential rates or premium payments 
I: 
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based on genetic information, or an individual's re-
quest for genetic services. 
(3) Insurance providers should be prohibited from 
requesting or requiring collection or disclosure of ge-
netic information. 
(4) Insurance providers and other holders of genetic 
information should be prohibited from releasing ge-
netic information without prior written authoriza-
tion of the individual. Written authorization should 
be required for each disclosure and include to whom 
the disclosure would be made. 
The recommendations further provide that genetic in-
formation be defined as "information about genes, gene 
products, or inherited characteristics that may derive from 
the individual or a family member. "65 Insurance provider 
is defined as "an insurance company, employer, or any other 
entity providing a plan of health insurance or health ben-
efits including group and individual health plans whether 
fully insured or self-funded."" 
These recommendations evolved, in part, from a criti-
cal analysis of State legislative approaches. nus analytical 
framework is intended to stimulate a comprehensive solu-
tion to geneti~-~scrimination in health insurance117 that 
integrates bach privacy protection and the reality that ge-
netic information is much more than jusr a test result. 
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